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instance, while Graham suggests that
China’s Song diesel submarine program
may have “fail[ed] . . . to develop according to schedule,” it is now noteworthy the extent to which Song
development appears to have progressed in parallel to China’s importing
of Kilo diesel submarines from Russia.
Graham projects that SLOC security
will continue to preoccupy Japanese
planners as a fundamental national
concern. He breaks significant ground
by showing that Japanese policy makers, motivated by increasingly “realist”
threat perceptions, are exploring new
directions in the pursuit of SLOC security. The extent to which these emerging impulses can transcend funding
constraints (imposed increasingly by
demographic and economic challenges)
and constitutional limitations (still protected, to some degree, by domestic
politics) remains a pivotal question for
all concerned with East Asian security.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Johnson, Stephen P. Silent Steel: The Mysterious
Death of the Nuclear Sub USS Scorpion. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2006. 292pp. $25.95

Several years ago I received a phone call
from Stephen Johnson asking about my
service on the USS Scorpion (SSN 589),
my first ship, between the fall of 1961
and the winter of 1962. He explained he
was writing a book about its loss in late
May 1968 with its entire crew of ninetynine. I spoke with him at some length
and sent some material about the vast
“SubSafe” program changes that occurred within the Submarine Force after the loss of USS Thresher (SSN 593)
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in April 1963. Silent Steel is the exquisitely researched result of my tiny input
and that of more than 230 others—
ranging from the widows of Scorpion
sailors, submarine design engineers and
naval architects, and a list of activeduty and retired personnel that reads
like a “who’s who” of the then and now
Submarine Force. The bibliography itself spans two dozen pages of applicable
books, journal articles, official reports,
memorandums, and other miscellaneous correspondence.
Anyone expecting to find a clear and
unambiguous set of events and circumstances that “explain” the Scorpion’s
loss will be disappointed. Rather, along
with fascinating personal insights into
some key players, the reader will find
erudite and technically credible discussions on the facts and assumptions of
any number of popular and not so popular theories. For example, his dispassionate and objective examination of
much of the same material that was
available to formal Navy courts of inquiry virtually rules out any concept of
“hostile action” and substantially weakens the plausibility of incidents involving the ship’s own torpedoes. He subtly
chides some advocates for having
drawn three-significant-figure conclusions from one-significant-figure assumptions. In addition, by bluntly
describing some bureaucratic foibles
and tragic administrative decisions
(such as shortchanging Scorpion’s
SubSafe package during a 1967 refueling overhaul to save money), Johnson’s
work leads one to perceive that—as is
true in virtually all submarine disasters
that we know something about—there
had to have been some series of complicating, cascading events that overwhelmed any efforts by the crew to bring
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the (perhaps minor) initiating casualty
under control. For those who delight in
finding small technical mistakes, there
are a few, if one looks closely enough—
for example, the Scorpion’s fire control
system was not a Mark 113 but a vintage Mark 101. But none detracts from
the overall high quality of the investigative effort.
Even without a specific “cause célèbre”
event to dissect and review for “lessons
learned,” Silent Steel provides much to
think about for anyone interested in or
involved with combating casualties at sea.
There is even some consolation, however small in comparison to the loss of
life, in the knowledge that the United
States has come to realize to a significant degree in the years since that “material readiness is a consumable”; we are
reluctant to run ships (and people) as
hard as we did in the early to mid-1960s.
When I rode Scorpion, it averaged more
than three hundred days a year at sea.
Today, even with dwindling platform
resources, the Submarine Force has begun to say no to many of the increasing
operational requirements from senior
regional and national commanders.
JAMES H. PATTON, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Keefer, Edward C., ed. Foreign Relations of the
U.S.: Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, vol. 6.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2006. 1,173pp. $65

This State Department volume, the first
of five that will cover the end period of
the Vietnam War, documents major
foreign policy issues of the Nixon administration, with a focus on U.S. policy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and to
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a lesser extent Laos during the period of
January 1969 to July 1970. What a time
it was!
In the 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Richard M. Nixon stated that he
had a plan to end the war in Vietnam.
As it turned out, the “plan” was embryonic. When he took office he moved
slowly, convinced that how the United
States ended the war would have an enduring impact on future American foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s
national security adviser, became the
key figure in the effort to end the war, a
program that became known as
“Vietnamization.”
Vietnamization was directed toward the
upgrading of South Vietnamese forces,
which was to be accompanied by
phased withdrawals of U.S. forces.
Completion would depend on how
things went in Vietnam. This work, in
addition to documenting policy efforts
to move this program along, also documents efforts to convince Hanoi that it
was dealing with a strong adversary: for
example, secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia, integration of the secret war in
Laos with the conflict in Vietnam, and
covert operations against North
Vietnam.
One of the principal themes developed
here is the search for a negotiated settlement, first in the Paris Peace Talks and
then through secret meetings between
Kissinger and North Vietnamese foreign
minister Xuan Thuy and special adviser
Le Duc Tho. Here, and throughout the
book, Kissinger’s memorandums to
Nixon are the key documents. Many appear in Kissinger’s memoirs; however, in
this work they are more complete.
In March 1970, Cambodia’s Norodom
Sihanouk was overthrown by the Lon
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